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GEORGE A. GOULD

Transfer of Water Rights

ABSTRACT
Industrialand urbangrowth in the western United States is placing
mounting pressure on existing water supplies. At the same time,
environmental concerns, economic considerations, and social attitudes impose new impediments to the development of additionalwater
supplies. As a result of these convergingforces, the transferof water
from existing uses-most often irrigation-isincreasinglyadvanced
as a solution to western water problems. This article examines legal
issues, policy questions, and practicaldifficulties which will determine the effectiveness of water rights transfersas a solutionto various
problems.

INTRODUCTION
A "transfer" typically signifies a change in ownership. Surprisingly,
this article is only incidentally concerned with changes in ownership of
water rights. Rather, its principal concern is with the extent to which the
owner of a water right may change the place or purpose of use of the
water which is the subject of the right. Changes in use, not changes in
ownership, are responsible for the problems, difficulties, and controversies associated with water rights transfers. Alienation of water rights
occurs with great frequency and with little difficulty; a water rights transfer
accompanies nearly every sale of irrigated land.' Significant issues arise
only when a change in use is involved, whether accompanied by a change
in ownership or not.
A water transfer can take a variety of forms. A transfer may be permanent or it may be temporary; it may involve a "sale" or "lease" of
water, rather than a transfer of the underlying water right. While different
sorts of transfers can raise different issues and problems, the key issue
and the common denominator in all these situations is a change in use.
Water rights transfers are a mechanism for reallocating water to new
*Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law.
I. See generally, I R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATEtR RIGHTS

§ 53.4 (1967).
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uses. Because appropriative water rights have perpetual duration, 2 transfers are necessary if water use is not to remain inflexibly frozen in initial
patterns of allocation. The increasing pressure for reallocation of water
in the West is the result of converging forces. On the one hand, industrialization and urbanization are making new demands on water resources.
At the same time, environmental concerns have diminished the water
available to meet those demands. Nearly every western state has some
form of instream flow legislation3 which inhibits the use of unappropriated
water for more traditional consumptive purposes. In addition, environmental objections are often raised to the construction of large reservoirs
and other facilities necessary for the development of remaining supplies.
Federal regulatory programs which are primarily concerned with environmental protection place some water off-limits for consumptive use.
The effect of these environmental requirements is to reduce the development of additional supplies-the time-honored western response to new
water demands. Consequently, if industrial and urban demands are to be
met, some transfers of water will be necessary.
The pressure for reallocation is not simply a result of demand exceeding
supply. Much of the pressure is financial. In spite of environmental requirements, additional water is available for development in much of the
West. However, it typically consists of snowmelt and floodwater which
occur in large quantities for short periods. Frequently, the purchase of
existing water rights provides a less expensive source of water than the
construction of the storage facilities necessary for the utilization of such
waters.
Dependability also makes the purchase of existing rights more attractive
than the acquisition of rights to unappropriated water. The priority rule
and the tremendous seasonal and annual fluctuations in the flows of many
western rivers often make new, late priority rights too undependable to
meet the requirements of new uses. Although it is possible to increase
dependability by constructing storage facilities, the purchase of existing
rights may provide a comparable degree of dependability at less cost.
Water rights transfers are an integral part of several other topics discussed in this volume. Water marketing is concerned with the allocation
of water through market forces. Transferability of rights is one of the
requirements for the efficient allocation of resources through the market2. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 459 (1931). Two states, however, deviate from the
usual pattern and provide for water rights of limited duration. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-596-040
(1986) limits certain large appropriations to a 50 year renewable term. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-38(2) (Supp. 1987) permits the state engineer to limit appropriations for a specific and certain period
of time.
3. See Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights,
25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 (1979).
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place. 4 Certainly, other issues, such as marginal pricing, are relevant to
a discussion of water marketing. Nevertheless, reducing impediments to
the free transfer of water rights is essential if water marketing is ever to
become more than a theoretical solution to water allocation problems.
Transfers are also a part of the efficiency question. There is little doubt
that the technical means for using water more efficiently exist. Much of
the efficiency debate concerns the best method to stimulate the adoption
of these technologies. On the one hand, there are those who would
mandate conservation by judicial and legislative decree.5 On the other
hand are those who argue that efficiency can best be achieved through
well-defined, fully transferable water rights.6
Transfer issues are also a part of the commerce clause and interstate
allocation problems associated with Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,7 City of El Paso v. Reynolds,8 and Colorado v. New Mexico.9 The
commerce clause essentially binds the United States into a single economic market. Because of the fundamental role of transfers in the marketplace, any debate involving the commerce clause and the allocation of
resources necessarily includes transfer questions. For example, New Mexico recently imposed new "public interest" requirements on the intrastate
transfer of water rights to nullify the claim that similar controls on interstate transfers discriminated against interstate commerce. °
More generally, water transfers are simply a topic whose time has
arrived. The application of economic (market) principles to legal problems
has been a growing movement within the legal community. Current political and social moods have strengthened this movement. Contemporary
opinions view government regulation as anathema and advance the
marketplace as the solution to all problems. While the marketplace will
probably not fulfill all that is sometimes claimed, market solutions to
water problems are receiving serious consideration, in turn giving prominence to questions involving transfers.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS TRANSFERS
From the inception of the prior appropriation doctrine in the mining
camps and courts of California, a water right has been a transferable
4. See Milliman, Water Law and Private Decisionmaking: A Critique, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. 41, 46,
(1959); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (1973).
5. See Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprintfor Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483, 521
(1982).
6. See Milliman, supra note 4, at 50-51.
7. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
8. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.Supp.379 (D.N.M. 1983), laterproceeding, 597 F.Supp.
694 (D.N.M. 1984).
9. 459 U.S. 176 (1982), later proceeding, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN., § 72-5-23 (Repl. Pamph. 1985), § 72-12-7 (Supp. 1988).
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property interest." This, no doubt, reflects the possessory origins of the
doctrine. Unlike riparian rights which are an incident of land ownershipone of the sticks of the bundle-the appropriation doctrine treats a water
right as an independent property interest which arises as a result of, and
only as a result of, the application of water to beneficial use. Arising
independently of land ownership, it is natural that the right should be
independently transferable.
Despite the foregoing, there are a number of impediments to the free
transfer of water rights. Almost from the first, the California Supreme
Court held that the transfer of a water right could not result in injury to
other (junior) appropriators. 2 This holding made the initial use of water
the measure of the right which could be transferred. Thus, transfers which
would increase consumption, decrease return flows, or in any way change
the availability of water to junior appropriators were prohibited or were
conditioned to eliminate these effects.
Other impediments were the result of statutes enacted to correct perceived deficiencies in the appropriation doctrine or to promote social
policies. An example of an impediment in the first category is the Wyoming statutory provision which prohibits the transfer of direct flow rights
for irrigation. 3 This statute was enacted at the urging of Elwood Mead,
Wyoming's first state engineer and one of the giants in the development
of modern water institutions. Mead had previously worked in Colorado
and had observed that appropriators there frequently claimed rights which
were greatly in excess of their need so that they could later sell the excess
to others. Such sales often caused substantial injury to junior appropriators
who had come to rely on the unused excess. Mead's solution was to
prohibit transfers.' 4 Although the Wyoming statute is so riddled with
exceptions 5 as to be more of a nuisance than a real impediment, it may
well have been the inspiration for the adoption by other states of statutes
tying the water to the land. 6
I1. Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261, 263 (1857); McDonald v. Bear River Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232
(1859).
12. Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal, 162, 181 (1860). The rule that a transfer cannot cause injury primarily
protects appropriators who are junior in priority to the right being transferred; senior appropriators
are protected by their priority. An alternate formulation of the rule, which emphasizes the protection
of junior appropriators, states: "[J.unior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations, and ... they may successfully
resist all proposed changes in points of diversion and use of water from that source which in any
way materially injures or adversely affects their rights." Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co.
v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629, 631 (1954).
13. WYo. STAT. §41-3-101 (1977).
14. E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 173-75 (1903).
15. See Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress--Case Studies of the Transfer of Water Rights. I
LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1966).
16. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. §533.040 (1985), OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 82-105.22 (Supp. 198788), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-5-34 (Rev. 1987).
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Statutes enacted in Montana 7 and North Dakota"8 in the 1970s furnish
examples of impediments which reflect social policies. Both states, facing
what appeared to be massive demands for water for energy development,
enacted legislation which inhibited the transfer of agricultural water rights
to energy use. These statutes were apparently adopted to preserve the
agricultural ambience of the states and to force energy concerns to develop
new water supplies rather than purchase existing agricultural rights.
Another group of impediments is associated with large water supply
organizations. It is doubtful that the Bureau of Reclamation has statutory
authority to permit water from particular bureau projects to be transferred
to nonagricultural uses. 9 Furthermore, the contracts under which the
bureau delivers water prohibit transfers or require the consent of the
bureau before project water can be used on a different parcel of land or
for a different use, whether within or outside the project boundaries.2" In
addition, neither the reclamation statutes nor the bureau regulations specify the criteria to be used by the bureau in deciding whether to approve
transfers. 2' Because of these and other complications, both the law and
the bureau practice with regard to transfers are said to be "murky." 2 2
The legal power of state conservation and irrigation districts to transfer
their water rights is said to be "extraordinarily murky." 23 In addition,
these districts frequently serve as middlemen between the Bureau of
Reclamation and individual farmers and are routinely given the power to
restrict the transfers of project water.24 Similarly, transfer of water supplied by mutual water companies is often restricted by contractual terms
or by-law provisions.25 Because so much water in the West is controlled
by the Bureau of Reclamation, by irrigation districts and conservancy
districts, and by mutual water companies, the prohibitions and uncertainties associated with the transfer of such water are extremely significant.26
17. MoNT. CODE ANN. §85-2-402(3) (1979), repealed by 1985 Mont. Laws, ch 573, §7.
18. N.D. CENT. CODE §§61-04-06.1 and 61-04-15.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
19. See Pring & Edelman, Reclamation Law Constraints on Energyllndustrial Uses of Western
Water, 8 NAT. RES. LAW 297, 299 (1975).
20. C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED
MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, LEGAL STUDY No. 18-25 (1971).
See also, Ellis & DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB. L. REV. 333 (1978).
Ellis and DuMars point out that agricultural interests have used these statutory and contractual
limitations to prevent the transfer of water out of irrigation. Id. at 338-50.
21. C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 20.
22. J. Leshy, After the Concrete Sets: The Future Role of the Bureau of Reclamation in Western
Water Management 14 (June 2-4, 1986) (unpublished outline of presentation at a short course entitled
Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law).
23. C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 25.
24. See Ellis & DuMars, supra note 20, at 350-53.
25. See Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 .2d 501 (Colo. 1982).
26. Ellis & DuMars, supra note 20, at 357, make the point that prohibitions on the purchase of
bureau project water drive up the price of private water rights.
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To summarize, water rights are transferable in the abstract. Nevertheless, substantial impediments to actual transferability exist. Many of the
legal questions discussed in the next section are associated with these
impediments.
LEGAL QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
Legal Prohibitions To Water Rights Transfers
Legal prohibitions to water rights transfers, such as Wyoming's "no
change" statute,27 are not numerous. Nevertheless, they can be very
disruptive. Other sorts of impediments can make transfers more difficult
or more expensive. Prohibitions make transfers impossible. Consequently,
legal prohibitions are certain to be an essential part of the debate concerning the transfer of water rights.
Prohibitions primarily present political and policy issues rather than
legal ones. An occasional interpretive question may arise concerning the
applicability of a prohibition in a particular situation. Similarly, attempts
to apply a transfer prohibition to water rights vested before the enactment
of the prohibition sometimes raise constitutional due process and takings
questions. Not much can be said about interpretive problems in a general
way; each must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
As to the constitutional problems, some court decisions suggest that
the retroactive application of transfer prohibitions would be unconstitutional.2 Several courts have applied such restrictions prospectively to
avoid constitutional questions.29 However, recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in the land use area suggest a different result. Those
decisions hold that the Constitution does not guarantee a person the most
valuable use for his property, but only a "reasonable beneficial use"' or
an "economically viable use."' More specifically, in finding that no
taking had occurred in Penn Central,3" the Court expressly relied on the
fact that the law in question permitted the railroad to continue the present
use of the property. Similarly, although a statute prohibiting the transfer
of water rights deprives the owner of the right to make a change in use,
he is not deprived of the right to continue the present use.
Transfer prohibitions are largely a matter of statute. Consequently,
27. See supra note 13.
28. See Hughes v. Lincoln Land Co., 27 F. Supp. 972 (D. Wyo. 1939); Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939).
29. Jewett v. Redwater Irrigating Ass'n, 88 S.D. 390, 220 N.W.2d 834 (1974); Farmers' &
Merchants' Irrigation Co. v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irrigation Co., 73 Neb. 223, 102 N.W.
487, 488 (1905),
30. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
31. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).

32. 430 U.S. at 136.
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political and policy questions concerning them will be addressed primarily
to legislative bodies. The success of efforts to repeal existing prohibitions
depends on the political strength of those seeking repeal and on the
persuasiveness of their arguments. In many cases, the prohibitions were
poorly conceived to begin with, or represent outmoded social policies
and would seem vulnerable to repeal attempts. In addition, the current
popularity of "market solutions" further enhances the likelihood of the
success of efforts to repeal transfer prohibitions. Nevertheless, some prohibitions are firmly ingrained in the water law of particular jurisdictions
and have shown remarkable durability."3 Furthermore, the view that water
use should be dictated solely by economic forces is not shared by everyone." Those less enthusiastic about water transfers may mount strong
resistance to the removal of existing prohibitions and may even attempt
to impose new prohibitions.
The "No Injury" Rule
Injuries to other appropriators, or "third-party effects," take a variety
of forms. The most common is largely a function of the return flow
phenomenon associated with irrigated agriculture. Although somewhat
of an over-simplification, the rule limits the transfer to the amount of
water consumed, thereby preserving the return flows for downstream
appropriators.35 Another common third-party effect results from changes
which alter the established pattern of use on a stream (for example,
changes in the point of diversion or changes which cause return flows to
enter the stream at a different point) and cause injury to other appropriators
even though consumption is not increased.36 Other third-party effects
include: stream conveyance losses which may result if the point of diversion is moved downstream on a "losing" stream;37 timing changes
which alter the length of the period or the season of the year during which
water is diverted and used;3" and changes in water quality.39
33. Although Frank Trelease criticized the Wyoming "no change" statute over 20 years ago, it
remains a part of Wyoming law today. See, Trelease & Lee, supra note 15.
34. See Dunning, Reflections on the Transfer of Water Rights, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 109 (1977);
Ingram, Scaff, & Silko, Replacing Confusion with Equity: Alternatives for Water Policy, in NEW
COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER (G.Weatherford and F Brown, eds. 1986); Kahrl, Should Water
Really Go To The Highest Bidder?, Sacramento Bee, June 22, 1986, Forum, at 1, col 1.
35. See Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954).
36. See Gould, Conversion ofAgricultural Water Rights to Industrial Use, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1791, 1836 (1981), Ellis & Dumars, supra note 20, at 363.
37. See Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133 (Colo.
1986).
38. See City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
39. See A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1978).
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Although third-party effects can block a transfer completely, more often
conditions will be imposed to mitigate the effects. For example, the rate
of diversion can be reduced' or limits can be placed on the total quantity
which can be diverted4 to prevent an increase in consumption or to
compensate for stream conveyance losses. If a water right for a seasonal
use such as irrigation is transferred, diversion of water may be limited
to specified dates.42 Alternatively, water can be acquired from a substitute
source to offset the effects which the transfer will cause.43
Third-party effects are a substantial impediment to the transfer of water
rights. Every western state requires administrative or judicial approval
before a transfer can be consummated. The central purpose of the agency
or court proceeding is the determination and mitigation of third-party
effects.
The issues which must be resolved in such proceedings are often highly
technical, requiring the assistance of various experts and the accumulation
of extensive data." For example, the major concern of transfer proceedings is typically to assure that the transfer does not cause a reduction in
return flows. However, there is no direct way of determining the return
flows from irrigation in most cases. In fact, even records of the amount
of water diverted are frequently nonexistent or unreliable. Thus, the usual
approach is to limit the amount of the transfer to the consumptive irrigation
requirements of the crops "historically" grown by the irrigator. Consumptive irrigation requirements are estimated by one of several methods
which are based on evapotranspiration associated with the crops grown."
The obvious assumption of this approach is that water not used in the
growing process returns to the stream.
A host of legal and factual difficulties make the process of determining
third-party effects expensive and the results unpredictable. The collection
of historical data concerning the types of crops grown and the number
of acres irrigated is required. The crop coefficients used to calculate
evapotranspiration are dependent on climate and altitude. Unless the coefficients used were developed for the particular region involved, questions
40. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954).
41. See Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
42. Id.
43. See Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d
288 (1976).
44. Some appreciation for the complexities of such proceedings can be garnered from reading
Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1986).
45. The Blaney-Criddle method is the most widely-used technique. By applying temperature and
sunshine data to consumptive use coefficients for various crops, consumptive use requirements
(evapotranspiration) can be estimated. By deducting natural precipitation from the consumptive use
requirements, the consumptive irrigation requirement is determined. See Blaney & Criddle, Determining Water Requirements for Settling Water Disputes, 4 NAT. REs. J. 29 (1964).
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of suitability are likely to be raised and must be resolved. Unanswered
legal questions, such as the proper calculation of "historic" use where
the cultivation of different crops with varying evapotranspiration rates
are involved, add to the unpredictability. Furthermore, the assumption
that the consumptive irrigation requirement completely measures "consumption" is often incorrect. "Consumption" includes all water that does
not return to the stream, rather than just that lost through evapotranspiration. ' Thus irrigation water is also consumed when it seeps into deep
aquifers or collects on the surface and evaporates. Factual disputes involving the extent of such losses further complicate the process of quantifying the transferable amount.
Although the "no injury" rule has not been without its critics,47 it has
generally received the support of most legal scholars and economists. 4"
The rule is said to promote more complete utilization of water resources
by providing security to water rights based on return flows.49 Furthermore,
it is argued that the rule promotes economic efficiency by allowing only
those transfers which result in an economic net gain to society as a whole."e
Whatever its merits, elimination of the rule at this late date would raise
serious constitutional questions.
Much of the future effort in this area will center on mechanisms to
minimize or eliminate the impact of the "no injury" rule. The determination of third-party effects by an administrative body which possesses
expertise in water matters, such as a state engineer's office, appears
preferable to determination through a court process, particularly if the
decisions of the agency are respected and accepted. Legislation enacted
in California in 1980, providing for "trial transfers" in situations where
substantial injuries are unlikely but the effects are difficult to predict,
provides an example of a mechanism which can sometimes streamline
the process." This legislation strikes a sensible balance between the need
to protect third parties and the recognition that actual operations will often
be the most reliable and cost effective methods of determining the effects
of a transfer. As a further means of enhancing the use of trial transfers,
one study suggested that other appropriators be required to accept damages
if injury does result. 2
46. Based on a "grammatical" interpretation of the Wyoming transfer statute, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has limited the quantity which may be transferred to that consumed in the growing
process. Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P2d 557 (Wyo. 1978). Wyoming
seems to be alone in interpreting "consumption" so narrowly.
47. J. SAX, WATER LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 207 (1965).
48. See Trelease, Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 507,
524 (1967); Milliman, supra note 4, at 54.
49. C. MEYERS AND R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 27.
50. Id.
51. CAL. WATER CODE 1735-1739 (West. Supp. 1986).
52. C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 33,
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Another approach is illustrated by newly adopted legislation in California which directs the Department of Water Resources to prepare a
water transfer guide including information and resources which could be
used to identify third-party effects and mitigation alternatives. "3 A related
method is apparently available in Utah where the staff of the state engineer's office will give an informal assessment of the conditions it would
impose if a particular transfer were made.54 These approaches aid the
transfer process by reducing the information and transactions costs and
the uncertainties associated with the "no injury" rule.
Presumptions are another possible means of reducing costs and delays.
For example, a presumption regarding return flows from irrigation" elim-

inates the need to ascertain return flows on a case-by-case basis. While
attempts to rebut the presumption would occur, such attempts would

probably be infrequent if the presumption represents a reasonable approximation of actual return flows. If reasonable approximations are not
possible on a statewide basis, it might be possible to develop separate

presumptions for particular areas.
Several writers have suggested that the solution to third-party effects
lies in defining water rights in terms of consumption, rather than in terms
of the rate or quantity of diversion, as is typically the case.56 Consumption,
they argue, "internalizes" most third-party effects, thereby eliminating

or minimizing the need for the complex transfer proceedings discussed
above. To put it differently, they argue that third-party effects will not
generally be significant if a transfer is limited to consumption. Consequently, they assert, the solution is simply to state the consumptive entitlement in the certificate or permit which describes the right.
While this approach has a beguiling simplicity, it is unlikely to be
adopted because it promises more than it can deliver. First, as proponents
53. CAL. WATER CODE §482 (West Supp. 1988). CAL.WATER CODE §§470, 475,480-483, 181014 (West Supp. 1988), adopted in 1986, are part of a continuing effort to enhance the legal climate
for water marketing in California. In addition to the information on third-party effects, the transfer
guide is to contain information on state and federal laws relating to water transfers, a list of persons
and agencies who might assist those interested in transfers, and a description of services available
from the Department of Water Resources. Section 481 requires the Department of Water Resources
to undertake a water "brokering" function to match potential buyers and sellers and to maintain a
list of water transportation facilities which may be available to carry out water transfers. Sections
1810-14 require state and public agencies to allow their water conveyance facilities to be used for
the transportation of transferred water if unused capacity exists. An uncodified provision of the 1986
legislation directs the Department of Water Resources to recommend changes in state law or policy
to facilitate transfers. 1986 Cal. Stat., ch 970, § 2.
54. Telephone conversation with Michael Quealy, Utah Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 1985).
55. E.g.. WYo. STAT. §41-3-110 (Supp. 1986). This statute, which authorizes temporary transfers, creates a presumption of 50% return flows.
56. Burness & Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency:The Colorado River.
23 J. LAW & ECON. Il l (1980); Johnson. Gisser, & Werner. The Definition of a Surface Water Right
and Transferability24 J. LAW & ECoM. 273 (1981); Gardner, The Untried Market Approach to Water
Allocation, in NEw COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 155 (G. Weatherford & F. Brown eds. 1986).
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of the approach note, consumption does not internalize all third-party
effects. Effects not internalized include those resulting from changes in
timing of use, in water quality, and in patterns of use. Consequently, a
transfer proceeding would still be required to determine such effects and
to prescribe conditions to mitigate them. Furthermore, redefinition of
existing water rights in terms of consumptive amount would involve the
expensive, time-consuming process presently encountered only when a
transfer occurs. Conducting such procedures on a massive scale would
be expensive and would be enormously wasteful because many of the
rights would never be transferred.
Finally, it should be noted that third-party effects do not affect all water
rights equally. Consider, for example, a water right to divert water from
one watershed to another. Other appropriators in the watershed of origin
are not affected by the manner of use, and thus a change in use involves
no third-party effects as far as they are concerned. 7 Appropriators in the
watershed to which the water is exported, who may be affected by a
change in use, are not protected because any benefits they may have
received from the imported water are considered positive spillovers which
they have no legal right to have continued. 8 Having provided the benefit
in the first place, the importer is free to recapture it or terminate it.
Consequently, such rights can be transferred without regard to third-party
effects. Water captured and stored in reservoirs may be treated similarly,
although the law involving such water is not generally so well settled as
is the law of imported water. 9
In the situations just described, third-party effects can be ignored because the law essentially gives the appropriator "ownership" rights to
the corpus of the water diverted. Thus, the appropriator may reduce or
eliminate return flows or make other changes without regard to the effect
on others.
Water supplied by large water distribution institutions sometimes receives similar treatment. The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD), which provides water to a large area in northeastern
Colorado, has created a system of transferable "shares," entitling the
holder to a specified portion of the water available to the district. The
water represented by these shares is transferred freely within the area
served by the district. Third-party effects are ignored because the district
retains title to all return flows.' One economist has suggested that serious
57. See Twin Lakes Reservoir Co. v. City of Aspen, 193 Colo. 478, 568 P.2d 45 (1977).
58. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979); City of Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs
v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co. 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972).
59. See Gould, supra note 36, at 1848-49.
60. C. Howe, Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation, The Potential for Water Markets 9-13
(June 2-4, 1986) (unpublished outline of presentation at a short course entitled Western Water:
Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
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consideration be given to the possibility of replicating the NCWCD market
structure in other areas served by large distribution institutions."
Along similar lines, a 1971 study prepared for the National Water
Commission recommended "mutualization" as a possible solution to the
problem of third-party effects.62 Mutualization would require appropriators in a given geographic area or stream system to surrender their individual rights to a mutual water company in exchange for shares entitling
them to a specified quantity of water. Water would be transferred freely
within the unitized area by the transfer of shares. As in the case of the
NCWCD, the third-party effects of such transfers would be eliminated
or minimized because the mutual company would essentially own return
flows within the area. However, the study noted several problems which
would impede the implementation of this scheme. The principal problems
stem from difficulties associated with converting individual water rights,
with different dates of priority and thus different values, into fungible
shares. 63
It is not necessary that all water be subject to easy transfer in order to
meet new demands. The needed flexibility can be provided if only a
portion of the water in a given region is subject to easy reallocation.'
Thus, water supplies described in the preceding paragraphs, which can
be transferred without considering third-party effects, could be important
in providing flexibility even where they represent only a small portion
of the total water supply. Furthermore, the adoption by other water distribution organizations of the market structure used by the NCWCD or
the mutualization of water rights could substantially increase the availability of water which is not subject to the "no injury" rule.
Transfers and Water Conservation
Market proponents argue that concerns with "beneficial use" and "waste"
are misconceived. They assert that the marketplace will eliminate waste
if water rights are well defined and fully transferable.6" According to the
argument, economic self- interest will cause the elimination of waste and
will result in the efficient use of water if salvaged water can be sold or
put to a new use.
A proposal involving the Imperial Irrigation District (liD) and the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) in southern California provides a
much-cited example. Waste water from the IID eventually enters the
61. Id.
POSNER, supra note 20. at 34-38.
63. Id. at 36-37.
64. Howe, supra note 60, at 3.
65. Milliman, supra note 4.

62. C. MEYERS & R.
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Salton Sea, a land-locked body of water. Because the Salton Sea is highly
saline, water which enters it cannot be used again. In recent years inflow
has exceeded evaporation, causing the Sea to rise and flood adjacent
lands. Because of this, lID is under considerable legal pressure from the
California courts' and from the California Water Resources Control Board67
to conserve water and reduce the flow of waste water into the Salton Sea.
The Environmental Defense Fund prepared a study which demonstrates
that it would be financially advantageous for MWD-which needs additional water supplies-and lID if MWD paid the cost of various conservation measures in exchange for the use of the salvaged water for
twenty years.68 Thus, it is suggested that the market will provide a solution
to liD's problems if permitted to do so.
According to market proponents, the failure of the market to eliminate
waste is largely the result of various legal and institutional impediments
which interfere with a market solution. Salt River Valley Users' Association v. Kovacovich69 is frequently used to illustrate this point. Kovacovich and others lined their ditches and adopted other conservation
practices thereby saving substantial quantities of water. Nevertheless, they
were not permitted to transfer this water to new lands. The water which
they salvaged simply became part of the common supply to be taken by
other appropriators free of charge. Curiously, the court found that the
result, which obviously destroys any incentive to voluntarily conserve
water, was required by the concept of beneficial use.
As the need for water to meet new demands intensifies, pressure will
increase to overrule cases and statutes which prohibit the transfer of
salvaged water. It seems that even skeptics of market solutions must
concede that voluntary elimination of waste will occur only where the
volunteers receive the fruits of their labors. Recent California legislation
provides a model. This legislation, enacted in 1982, expressly provides
that water salvaged may be "sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise transferred." 70 Another section enacted at the same time permits the transfer
of water where there has been a reduction in water needs through the use
of reclaimed water or polluted water.7 ' The purpose of this section is to
encourage the substitution of poor quality water for high quality water
where possible by giving those who do so a right to transfer the high
66. See Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 165 Cal App.3d 952, 212 Cal. Rptr.
701 (1985); Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 159 Cal. App.3d 185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
67. Decision 1600, California Water Resources Control Board (June 21, 1984).
68. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER (1983).
69. 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1968).
70. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West Supp. 1986); see also, id. at §§ 1010, 1012 (West Supp.
1988).
71. Id. at § 1010.
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quality water no longer needed. Judicial decisions in Colorado72 and
Utah" also indicate that salvaged water can be transferred.
Both sections of the California legislation discussed above subject a
transfer of salvaged water to the usual procedures and requirements for
the transfer of a water right. These include, presumably, the requirement
that the transfer not injure other appropriators. The Colorado and Utah
decisions impose a similar limitation on the transfer of salvaged water.
Application of the "no injury" rule introduces the complications discussed
in the preceding section and makes the transfer of salvaged water more
difficult. Nevertheless, scrutiny of such transfers to protect against thirdparty effects seems particularly appropriate. Various measures which appear to conserve water may actually produce no savings when the entire
stream system is considered. For example, lining irrigation ditches may
reduce seepage and give the appearance of saving water. However, if the
seepage returns to the stream and is used by others downstream, then the
savings are illusory. Expanded use by the "salvager" is at the expense
of downstream parties and is properly prohibited by the "no injury" rule.
Where it can be shown that salvage efforts have resulted in a reduction
in consumption, considering the entire stream system, then there seems
to be no good policy reason not to permit the transfer.
Temporary Transfers
If maximum flexibility and efficiency in water use are to be achieved,
it is necessary to have a means for temporary reallocation of water. For
example, a city might have adequate water supplies to meet its needs in
normal years, but may need additional sources of water in drought years.
A nearby farmer might have a water right with an early priority which
would meet the city's drought needs. A mechanism which permits the
city to purchase water only in drought years would undoubtedly reduce
the cost to the city and would benefit society by permitting continued
farming except in drought years.
Western water law is deficient in mechanisms for temporary transfers.
Only a few western states have enacted statutes which authorize such
transfers,74 and even in these states the statutes are not adequate. In
general, the statutes accommodate temporary transfers by providing a
somewhat expedited transfer procedure and by providing that the original
use is automatically restored at the termination of the temporary use,
thereby eliminating the need for a second transfer. Most of the statutes
Danielson v. Kerbs AG., Inc., 646 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1982),
East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954).
See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725 to 1730 (West Supp. 1988); N. M. STAT. ANN. §§7272-6-7 (Repl. Pamph. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Cum. Supp. 1987); WASH. REV.
CODE §90.03.390 (Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. §41-3-110 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
72.
73.
74.
6-1 to
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are designed for a temporary, one-time need and seem inapplicable to
situations in which water is needed on an intermittent basis. However,
the best of the lot, New Mexico's Water Use Leasing Act,75 does appear
to authorize transfers to meet intermittent needs.
Third-party effects are even more of a problem for temporary transfers
than for permanent transfers because of the short-term nature of the use.
Some of the statutes attempt to reduce the delay associated with the
determination of third-party effects by giving water officials the authority
to approve the transfer without notice to potentially affected parties if the
officials determine that there will be no effects.76 Wyoming deals with
third-party effects by creating a presumption that return flows from irrigation are 50 percent, thus eliminating the need to actually determine
return flows. 77
While the devices just described are helpful in reducing the effect of
the "no injury" rule on temporary transfers, they are by no means a
complete solution. It may be possible to design other procedures to further
minimize the effect of the rule. Nevertheless, it will remain a major
obstacle at best. Consequently, temporary transfers will be most viable
in the situations discussed above7" where third-party effects can be ignored.
The Subsidy Issue
Much of the water used by irrigated agriculture in the West, particularly
that provided by the Bureau of Reclamation, is supplied at a price that
does not reflect the full cost of supplying the water. There has long been
a debate over how these subsidies should be dealt with if this water is
transferred. 79 This debate is certain to intensify as the possibility of largescale transfers of such water increases.
An example will illuminate the problem. Suppose that the bureau sells
water costing the bureau $8/ac-ft to a group of farmers at $4/ac-ft. Suppose
further that the value of the water to farmers is $8/ac-ft and that a city
is willing to pay $20/ac-ft for the water." If this water is sold to the city,
how should the purchase price be divided? The possible choices range
from giving the farmer the $20/ac-ft price, minus the $4/ac-ft charge
owed the bureau (resulting in a $16/ac-ft "windfall" to the farmer), to
giving the bureau the entire $20/ac-ft.
75. N. M. STAT. ANN. §§72-6-1 to 72-6-7 (Repl. Pamph. 1985).
76. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-1730 (West Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-3 (Cum.
Supp. 1987).
77. Wyo. STAT. §41-3-110(c) (Cur. Supp. 1988).
78. See text accompanying note 50.
79. See Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 13 (1965).
80. This example is taken from C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 23-24,
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In a study prepared for the National Water Commission, Charles Meyers
and Richard Posner argued that the farmer should not be required to share
such a windfall with the bureau. 8 They gave two reasons. First, they
noted that only $4 of the $16 windfall is due to the bureau subsidy; the
other $12 is due to the higher value which the city places on the water.
In addition, they noted that under existing law the farmer could capture
the $4 subsidy by selling the land to another farmer. Second, they argued
that any sharing of the windfall could defeat market transfers of water to
higher value uses. Because they adopted the reallocation of water to higher
value uses as the "dominant goal," it is not surprising that they opposed
any rule that would interfere with such transfers.
On the other hand, subsidized agricultural water is no accident. The
subsidies were created purposely to further social policies- to settle the
West, to promote agriculture, to provide cheap food, etc. Noting this,
others have argued that transfer of the water should not be permitted82 or
that the bureau, not the farmer, should receive the entire windfall.83 The
latter approach would effectively prohibit transfers because the farmer,
receiving none of the reward, would have no financial incentive to sell.
In fact, this approach would provide a disincentive to sell the water to a
higher value use because under present law the farmer could capture the
$4 subsidy by continuing to farm or by selling the land to another farmer.
There is, however, a middle ground. Without judging whether subsidies
were a good policy in the first place, it is possible to concede that it may
now be time to permit some subsidized water to be put to higher value
uses. However, a sound argument can also be made that the government,
as financier of the capital improvements which provide the water, should
share some of the gain resulting from the change. Further, contrary to
what Meyers and Posner suggest, it is possible for the government to
share the windfall without discouraging transfers to higher value uses.
To return to our example, the value of the subsidy to the farmer is $4/
ac-ft ($8/ac-ft value for agricultural use less the $4/ac-ft that the farmer
must pay for it). As a rational economic man, the farmer should be willing
to sell so long as he receives a net return of more than $4/ac-ft. Assuming
a sale price of $20/ac-ft, the sale should occur if the farmer receives $5!
ac-ft and the bureau $15/ac-ft. If the city is willing to pay only $10/acft, the sale will still occur if the farmer receives $5/ac-ft and the bureau
$5/ac-ft.
Looking at this example in a slightly different way, the bureau is clearly
81. Id.
82. Kahrl, supra note 34, at 6, col I.
83. Sax, supra note 79. Sax would require that the windfall be retained in the project, reducing
the cost of the project to other farmers, and thereby continuing the agricultural sqbsidy that Congress
intended. Id. at 36-40.
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entitled to the first $4/ac-ft from a sale of the water. 4 If transfers to higher
value uses are to occur, the farmer must get the next $4/ac-ft, plus perhaps
some small increment of profit; otherwise, he will not sell. Thereafter,
the remaining windfall can be split in many ways. For example, the
parties could divide it evenly or the bureau could first recover its unreimbursed costs ($4/ac-ft) and the excess, if any, could then be split.
The exact manner of dividing the windfall is not important to this discussion. The point is, it is possible to work out a formula which encourages transfers and yet permits the government providing the subsidy
to share in the windfall resulting from the transfer.
The Public Interest
A change in use can produce adverse effects which do not fall on other
appropriators. Some are indirect effects, such as the decline in the local
economy, the erosion of the tax base, and the general social disruption
that may accompany the transfer of agricultural water to other uses in
distant places. Other effects, such as the destruction of fish and wildlife
habitat and the loss of recreational opportunities which result from a
change in use, are more direct. Because these effects do not fall on
"appropriators," the law provides no direct protection to those affected.85
However, there is a growing trend to require that some or all of these
effects be considered in water transfers as part of a state's duty to protect
the "public interest."
All western states except Colorado and Montana require their water
officials to consider the "public interest" in deciding whether to issue a
permit for the initial appropriation of water.8 6 The mandate of these
statutes is often vague, and the statutes received sparing use in the past.
However, spurred on by environmental policy acts and more precise
legislative mandates, the scope of these statutes and their use have expanded in recent years. Nevertheless, until quite recently, the consideration of "public interest" criteria in transfer proceedings was not required
in most states. In fact, the language of most transfer statutes, which
provides that a proposed transfer shall be approved if it does not impair
the rights of other appropriators, suggests that it was not proper to consider
public interest criteria in transfer proceedings.
The trend toward examining the public interest in water transfers is
84. At the very least the Bureau is entitled to the price at which it agreed to sell water to the
farmer in the first place.
85. One exception to this statement should be noted. Some states authorize instream appropriations
by public agencies to protect aquatic habitat. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973). Pre-

sumably, a change in use may not cause injury to instream appropriations, where they exist.
86. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255 (West 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Cum.
Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. §41-4-503 (1977).
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seen in statutes directing water officials to consider: the economic effect
which a transfer will have on the community where the use currently
occurs; 7 the effect of the transfer on fish, wildlife, and other instream
uses;"g or more broadly, to consider the effect of the transfer on the "public
interest." 9 In addition, one court required consideration of the public
interest without express statutory language mandating it.' Furthermore,
development of the "public trust" doctrine, exemplified by the California
Supreme Court's decision in the National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court case, 9 1 provides an alternate rationale for requiring consideration
of environmental effects in water transfers.
Consideration of the public interest in water transfers is certain to be
controversial, particularly the consideration of economic and social effects. Consideration of environmental effects is likely to be less controversial for at least two reasons. First, protection of the environment is
now a well-established governmental function. Second, environmental
values are not well represented in the marketplace and special treatment
of them may be justified.
On the other hand, government has not generally provided protection
from the indirect economic and social effects of resource allocation decisions. Noting that resource shifts are common in our dynamic economy
and are the source of much of our economic growth, one economist has
argued that there is little that the government can or should do about the
indirect economic injuries which result from water transfers, beyond
existing wealth redistribution programs such as unemployment compensation and welfare.92 Nevertheless, water is not just any resource, and
the question is not simply one of individual economic loss. Fierce regional
attitudes and strong policy questions are at the heart of this issue. Intertwined in western water law is a strong thread that all geographic regions
should enjoy the benefits of water. This thread is evident in the adoption
of interstate compacts and "area of origin" statutes9 which preserve water
for slower developing regions. Further, there are those who will question
the wisdom of destroying small, vital, rural communities to provide water
to sprawling, "unlivable" cities. After more than 70 years, the "rape"
of the Owens Valley by Los Angeles evokes strong emotions in California.
87. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-104(A) (1977),
88. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725, 1738 (West Supp. 1988).
89. NEv. REV. STAT. §46-234 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1985) and §7212-7 (Cum. Supp. 1988),
90. Clark v. Briscoe, 200 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra, Ensenada Land & Water
Assoc. v. Sleeper; 27 N.M. St. B. Bull. 524 (C. App. Sept. 1. 1988).
91. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.Rptr 346
(1983).
92. Gardner, supra note 56.
93. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460-11463 (West 1971).
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Even if one accepts that indirect social and economic effects should
be considered as part of the transfer process, the balancing which these
decisions will require will make them controversial. A New Mexico trial
court opinion, subsequently reversed, is illustrative. Ensenada Land &
Water Association v. Sleeper" involved an application to transfer water
from irrigation to use in connection with a ski area. The district court
denied the application, finding that a transfer of the water was not in the
public interest." The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, it
found that the ski area would produce few jobs for local inhabitants except
at menial levels. Second, in a part of the opinion sprinkled with emotioncharged phrases such as "fierce pride" and "deep-felt and tradition-bound
ties . . . to the land and water," the court found that economic benefits
were insufficient to overcome the effects of the transfer on the traditions
and culture of the region. One need not be an apostle of the "marketplace"
to question whether a judge or an administrator is qualified to decide that
the inhabitants of a region would prefer subsistence farming to economic
development.
Finally, the introduction of public interest criteria into the transfer
process at a time when states are trying to increase transfers is a bit ironic.
These criteria introduce additional uncertainties and thereby impede transfers. Even so, the call to consider the public interest in transfers is certain
to intensify if large numbers of transfers become commonplace."
Miscellaneous Issues
Interstate transfer of water rights is an issue receiving a good deal of
attention. For the most part, the attention is centered on the commerce
clause problems discussed elsewhere in this volume. There are also administrative problems of such transfers.
Few unique administrative problems are generated by an interstate
transfer if the water is removed from the stream and placed in an artificial
transportation structure such as a pipeline. However, some of the proposals being discussed would use natural conduits to convey the water
to another state. One frequently discussed proposal, the Galloway Project,
proposed a transfer of water from western Colorado to San Diego, Cal94. Rio Arriba County Cause No. RA 84-53 (C) (N.M. Ist J. Dist. April 16, 1985), rev'd Ensenada
Land & Water Assoc. v. Sleeper, 27 N.M.St.B. Bull 524 (Ct.App. Sept. 1, 1988).
95. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the statutes in force at
the time of the application did not allow denial of a transfer on general public interest considerations.
The New Mexico legislature amended the transfer statutes to required consideration of the public
interest between the time of the trial court decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals. See
supra note 89. The Court of Appeals did not discuss whether the grounds for denial cited by the
trial court are appropriate under the new statute.
96. See generally, Dunning, supra note 34; Ingram, Scaff & Silko, supra note 34.
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ifornia, via the Colorado River.97 Calculating the carriage and evaporation
losses resulting from the transport of this water hundreds of miles down
river through several major reservoirs would be a formidable task. Similarly, accounting for this water as it passes down the Colorado River
and through the reservoirs is difficult. Transfers of this sort would call at
least for an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the water officials of two or more states. For example, the Galloway Proposal would
require the coordination of water officials in Colorado and California,
and of the federal officials responsible for the operation of the federal
reservoirs on the Colorado. Transfers which do not involve such great
distances may be somewhat less complex. Obtaining the cooperation and
coordination of state officials is an additional significant barrier to interstate transfers.
The transfer of Indian water rights is another issue in water marketing.
To understand this issue, one must have some appreciation for the nature
of Indian water rights. Under the Winters doctrine,98 Indian reservations
confer a water right entitling Indians to sufficient water to carry out the
purposes of the reservation." The priority date of the right is the date
the reservation was established." Although the purposes of the reservation measure the quantity of water that is reserved, the Indians' use of
reserved water, once quantified, is not confined to those purposes.'°'
Western officials and water interests view Indian water fights as a "loose
cannon on deck," with the potential to wreak havoc with state water
fights. Because of their early priority date, Indian water rights are usually
senior to all but a few non-Indian fights, and exercise of Indian rights
will often require a drop-for-drop reduction in the use of water by nonIndians. Thus far, this "loose cannon" has failed to strike anything substantial, largely because the Indians have not had the economic resources
to develop their rights. However, a much different situation is presented
97. See Simms & Davis, Water Transfers Across State Systems, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
22-1, 22-25 (1985).
98. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
99. The most frequently used standard for quantifying Indian water rights has been the "practicably
irnigable acreage" standard, under which the Indians receive sufficient water to irrigate all practicably
irrigable acres on the reservation. See. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see also. Palma,
Indian Water Rights: A State Perspective after Akin, 57 NEn. L. REv. 295, 305-06 (1978).

100. There has been some debate on this point. Some writers have argued that Indian water rights
are based on an "aboriginal rights doctrine" and, thus, the right dates from "time immemorial."
See Dwello, Indian Water Rights-The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GoNz. L. REv. 215 (1971);
Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
631 (1971). While the Supreme Court has never definitively decided the issue, the courts have
always chosen the date of the reservation when referring to Indian rights, and the clear weight of
authority supports that date. See P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETERICH, & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDs

220 (1977).

101. See Arizona v. California, 440 U.S. 59 (1979).
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if the Indians can sell or lease their rights to others for use off the
reservation.
Indians' early priority dates, coupled with the fact that the water is not
currently being used by the Indians, makes Indian rights an attractive
source of water for new uses. Although there has been a good deal of
speculation--pro and con-regarding the use of Indian water off the
reservation,"' there is as yet no definitive law on the subject. Again, as
the demand for water to meet new needs intensifies, the subject will
undoubtedly receive more attention. The mere possibility of transfer could
spur state efforts to increase the transferability of non-Indian rights to
reduce the pressure to consider transferring Indian rights.
CONCLUSION
The issues associated with the transfer of water rights do not pose a
major threat to state primacy in water management. The states remain
largely in control of their destiny with regard to transfer. Nevertheless,
the approaches which the states take toward the resolution of the complex
problems and important policy questions raised by water rights transfers
could have a significant effect on established patterns of water use. In
the faster growing parts of the West, such as California, efforts are being
made to unravel the problems and to grapple with the policy questions.
Despite this, remarkably little has changed thus far. In other parts of the
West, the energy boom having gone bust, there is very little political
interest in these issues. How much change actually occurs remains to be
seen.

102. See Clyde, Special Considerations Involving Indian Rights, 8 NAT REs. LAW. 237, 250-251
(1975); Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MoNT. L. REv. 266 (1972); Moses,
The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine-From 1866 Through Eagle County, NAT. REs. LAW. 221,
232 (1975); Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of Our Discontent, 88 YALE L. J.
1689, 1700-02 (1979).

